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RECALIBRATING PATENT VENUE 
 
By Colleen V. Chien and Michael Risch1 
 
Abstract 
 
For most of patent law’s 200-year plus history, the rule has been that patentholders are 
permitted to sue defendants only in the district they inhabit. In 1990, the Federal Circuit 
changed this by enlarging the scope of permissible venue to all districts with personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant. Since then, patentees have flocked to fewer districts, and in 
2015, brought more than 40% of their cases in a single rural district with 1% of the US 
population, the Eastern District of Texas. Fueled in particular by concerns that non-practicing 
entities (NPEs), who bring the majority of cases in the Eastern District, are abusing venue, 
several pending Congressional bills and the TC Heartland case, potentially headed for Supreme 
Court review, could reinstate a more restrictive rule. We add to the policy discussion by 
reporting on a novel analysis of ~1,500 patent and non-patent cases filed in 2015, to explore 
how filing patterns might be impacted under different versions of the law. We find that about 
86% of 2015 patent cases were brought outside of the defendant’s home district (principal 
place of business), a strikingly high share. Things would change if venue were reformed, but the 
specifics vary. If the courts decided to restrict venue to where defendant resides or has an 
established place of business, an estimated 58% of 2015 cases would have had to been filed in a 
different venue. Plaintiffs of all types would be impacted, though NPEs would be impacted 
more. If venues that the plaintiff has filed in in the past few years are included (familiar 
districts), the shares of required refilings would drop to 53%.  But if Congress decides that cases 
can also be filed in home districts with research or manufacturing connections to the case, 
about half the NPE cases in our sample would have to be refiled in an unfamiliar district, but 
only 14% of the operating company cases would. 
 
Introduction 
 
A party planning to file a lawsuit often has the option of filing its case in several different 
districts. Cost and convenience are likely to factor into this decision to some extent, but also 
important—some would say more so—is the expectation that certain forums are more likely 
than others to favor the plaintiff’s interest, perhaps by interpreting the law in a desired fashion 
or by offering procedural or other advantages.  The selection of a forum believed to be 
                                                          
1 Colleen V. Chien is Associate Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law and Michael Risch is 
Professor of Law at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law. We thank Tom Cotter for his contributions 
to this article, Lex Machina for providing case data, Unified Patents for providing entity codings, Innography for 
providing patent data, Ben Singer, Ann Fort, and Robert Khose for helpful discussions and research assistants 
Theresa Yuan, Ben Meyer, Noah Weeks-Brittan, Reuben Bauer, Emma Stone, Campbell Yore, Max Looper, Amanda 
Garger, Christie Larochelle, for their help. This article expands on a solicited piece the authors wrote for the 
Washington Post, IN THEORY BLOG, A Patent Reform We Can All Agree On (Nov. 20, 2015) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/11/20/why-do-patent-lawyers-like-to-file-in-
texas/?utm_term=.b82e09df51ba. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2834130 
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favorable to one’s side—usually the plaintiff’s, though defendants have some opportunities to 
engage in the practice as well—is referred to as “forum shopping.”2   
Over the past decade, patent plaintiffs have increasingly chosen to file their suits in just 
a few districts, primarily the otherwise little-noted Eastern District of Texas. Though the District 
encompasses about one quarter of the State of Texas, it is largely rural and few major 
corporations or tech firms are headquartered there. The Eastern District’s 3.5 million people3 – 
its largest cities are Plano (population 274,000), Beaumont (118,000), and Tyler (100,000) – 
comprise about 13% of the population of Texas, and about 1% of the total U.S. population.  But 
in 2015, 44% of all patent cases were initiated there.4 The next closest district—which is also 
out of proportion to population— is Delaware, at 9% of all patent cases. 
To be sure, the current state of venue law allows filings in these districts, and the 
applicable codes of professional ethics do not forbid lawyers from engaging in forum shopping. 
Thus, whether one views forum shopping as good or bad is often entwined with one’s views of 
how the law should treat plaintiffs and defendants. However, whether forum shopping is 
consistent with the public interest is another matter. The sense that filing in Texas provides 
advantages to plaintiffs in outcomes and procedures—for better or worse—have harmed the 
reputation of the patent system. This conglomeration of cases has produced bizarre behavior 
that includes, as noted by late night comedian John Oliver, the sponsoring of an outdoor skating 
rink by frequent defendant Samsung in order to curry favor with local juries.5 While choice of 
forum in theory can produce a more efficient, responsive judiciary, we believe that a system 
that incentivizes such acts is far less defensible. 
The Eastern District has been the most popular venue for patent cases in all years but 
two of the last ten years. But not among all plaintiffs – while 63% of patent assertion entity 
filings in 2015 were in the Eastern District of Texas,6  less than 10% of filings by operating 
companies and individuals were. As such, there is a chance that, in contrast to other patent 
reforms that would sweep more broadly, such as mandatory loser-pays legislation or limits on 
discovery, reforms that would make forum shopping harder may represent changes that the 
majority of the patent system’s diverse stakeholders can agree upon.7  
                                                          
2 See Francesco Parisi & Erin A. O’Hara, Conflict of Laws, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
387, 389.  Parisi and O’Hara distinguish between bilateral, ex ante forum selection by means of forum selection 
clauses, and ex post forum shopping as described above, on the ground that the former, but not the latter, is likely 
to be efficient.  Forum selection clauses are found in many contracts, particularly mass merchandise contracts, and 
generally are enforceable.  See, e.g., Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013). 
3 The United States Attorney’s Office, District Info, Eastern District of Texas (reporting 2010 census data), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edtx/district-info. 
4 Brian Howard, Announcing the Patent Litigation Year in Review 2015, LEX MACHINA (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://lexmachina.com/14318/. 
5 Show summarized by Tom Gerencer, John Oliver Takes on Patent Trolls MoneyNation (May 4, 2015) available at 
http://moneynation.com/john-oliver-takes-patent-trolls/. 
6 Unified Patents, Unified Patents 2015 Patent Dispute Report (Mar. 2015), 
http://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report. 
7 We realize, of course, that patent plaintiffs may not be so happy with such changes, though if given a choice of 
sweeping reform and venue reform, they might well pick venue. 
3 
 
The easiest way to reduce forum shopping would be to unwind the conditions that 
enable it:  a multitude of potential forums from which litigants may choose and the ability of 
district courts to differentiate themselves from one another in terms of potential benefits they 
can offer.8 Because it is very difficult to mandate how judges run their courtrooms, limiting the 
choice of forum may be the most expedient solution. 
In fact, plaintiffs’ current, expansive choice of venue has been the exception more than 
it has been the rule during patent law’s 200-year plus history, during which venue has been 
restricted to districts inhabited by the defendant, namely its state of incorporation. But in 1990, 
the Federal Circuit, in response to a change in the general venue law enacted by Congress in 
1988, ruled that Congress intended to make the patent rule more permissive and allow 
disputes to be filed in any district in which there was personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Since corporations tend to sell products throughout the United States, VE Holding basically 
permits patent owners to sue them for infringement anywhere.9   
Scholars, advocates, late-night comedians, and at least one presidential hopeful10 have  
noted the concentration of cases in Texas and contemplated how the rules should be reformed. 
Momentum is building behind proposed changes. One defendant’s challenge—from Delaware 
and not Texas, interestingly—is now winding its way through the appeals process and may 
present the Supreme Court with the opportunity to reinstate a more restrictive view of patent 
venue.11 Congress is now contemplating a bill that would recalibrate the law somewhere in 
between these two points, allowing cases to be brought in districts of the plaintiff and the 
defendant with a connection to the accused infringement.12  
While most academic commentary to date has focused on explaining filing patterns and 
suggesting ways to curb forum shopping, our paper takes a different approach. Rather than 
debate the theory or merits of various versions of venue reform in the abstract, we evaluate 
and, where possible, empirically address several issues that we believe should be front and 
center in the minds of those who are considering or advocating for venue reform. We make 
three distinctive contributions. 
                                                          
8 Or, in Matthew Sag’s pithy formulation, “Advantage + Choice = Forum Shopping.”  Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in 
United States District Courts:  1994 to 2014 (Jan. 14, 2016), 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1065 (2016). 
9 Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F. 3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (shipping product to 
distribution channels in state conferred jurisdiction). For further discussion, see, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, 
Patentography (April 14, 2010), 85 NYU L. Rev. 1444 (2010).  As of this writing, the Federal Circuit is being asked to 
reconsider VE Holding on several grounds; for discussion, see Dennis Crouch, Choosing a District for Patent 
Infringement Filing and Giving Meaning to Section 1400(b), Patently-O Blog (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/choosing-district-infringement.html; Dennis Crouch, Where Does a 
Defendant “Reside” for Jurisdictional Purposes in Patent Infringement Cases, Patently-O Blog (Oct. 26, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/defendant-jurisdictional-infringement.html.     
10 Hillary Clinton’s Initiative on Technology & Innovation, 
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2016/06/27/hillary-clintons-initiative-on-technology-
innovation/. 
11 In re: TC Heartland LLC, No. 16-105 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
12 Discussed Part I, infra. 
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 First, while most of the attention has focused primarily on the recent concentration of 
cases in the Eastern District, our paper attempts to situate current trends within a longer 
history, not only of forum shopping in patent law, but also other areas of law. To do so, we 
review the historical evolution of patent venue from a legal and descriptive perspective, and 
the economic and institutional factors that have contributed to forum shopping not only in the 
Eastern District but favored courts in other areas of law, like the Delaware bankruptcy court. 
We also perform an analysis of venue trends in other areas of law based on considering a small 
sample of about 500 non-patent cases, to understand the extent to which patent forum 
shopping is unique or common. Finally, we also note that a number of recent changes have 
reduced both the absolute and relative number of patent case filings in the Eastern District, and 
consider whether forum shopping may also naturally be on the wane. 
Second, we evaluate the static effects of a rule change. Taking a sample of 1,000 
randomly chosen patent cases from 2015, we assess whether or not they could have been 
brought in their chosen venues under proposed versions of the law. We combine courts records 
with information about the parties themselves – their entity type, whether defendants were 
publicly traded companies and the primary industries they were in, and the past filing patterns 
of plaintiffs. If venue were restricted by the courts through a more limited reading of existing 
law, or by Congress legislating a new rule, what share of cases, which cases, and what industries 
would be impacted? While the problem of forum shopping may appear targeted, and 
concentrated in the Eastern District we assess the proposed solutions for the breadth of their 
impact on various types of plaintiffs and defendants.   
Finally, though we cannot predict the future, we attempt to consider the dynamic 
effects of a rule change. Many companies are headquartered in Delaware. Would a new rule 
simply shift, rather than resolve, the concentration of patent cases?  To address this question 
we look not only at where plaintiffs filed the 1,000 2015 cases in our sample, but also where 
they might file these same cases, in view of not only new rules but also their own past filing 
patterns and the patterns of their peers.  
Our empirical analysis considers about 1,500 patent and non-patent cases filed in 2015, 
and explores how filing patterns might be impacted under different versions of the law. We find 
that about 86% of cases were brought in districts outside of the home (principal place of 
business) districts of the defendants in 2015. The comparable number among other causes of 
action, based on our analysis, varied widely, with one defendant sued away from its home 
district 62% of the time, and another sued in distant locales 100% of the time. If the courts 
decided to construe the statutory language strictly, and restrict venue to where defendant 
resides or has an established place of business, we estimate that about 58% of the 2015 cases 
in our sample would have had to been filed in a different venue. Plaintiffs of all types would be 
impacted with NPEs having to move about eight percentage points more often. If venues that 
the plaintiff has filed in in the past few years are included (familiar districts), the shares of 
required refilings would drop to 53%.  If plaintiff’s home districts were also allowed, something 
Congress is considering primarily for the benefit of operating companies, universities, and failed 
startups, then 47% of NPE cases would have to move, while only 14% of operating company 
cases would have to be refiled in an unfamiliar district. 
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 The paper proceeds as follows. Part I explores the legal and descriptive history of patent 
venue, and the enabling conditions and motivations for forum shopping through the present. It 
also reviews the potential future of venue through the lens of current Congressional and court 
proposals. Part II describes the methodology and assumptions we used to address the three 
issues discussed above – the context, the static effects, and the dynamic effects of the 
proposed changes – through rigorous empirical analysis. Part III presents and describes our 
results and their implications for venue reform efforts. Part IV concludes. 
PART I 
The question of where patentees can properly bring their cases has received an 
inordinate amount of recent attention in light of the high concentration of patent filings in just 
a handful of venues. But for much of patent law’s history, it has been well-settled that special 
rules limit where patent lawsuits can be brought. In this Part, we discuss the evolution of patent 
venue law, and related developments in general venue law, as well as the combination of 
favorable law, favorable procedures, and favorable economics that have contributed to the 
current state of affairs. Next, we consider the patterns of filing that have followed, and previous 
developments intended to limit forum shopping in patent cases. Finally we discuss proposals 
for reforming patent venue currently under consideration.  
How We Got Here 
Permissive Venue in Patent Law 
In order to bring a lawsuit, a plaintiff must establish proper venue and personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant. General rules, covering all civil suits, and rules specific to patent 
law, as well as rules that have sanctioned restrictive and permissive venue have governed 
patent cases over their long history. For the first hundred years or so, patent venue was 
governed by a general statute. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed suits in civil 
cases—including patent cases—only where the defendant inhabited or could be found.13 In the 
early 19th century, most defendants were individuals and could be found only where they 
inhabited. As a result, when Thomas Blanchard sought to enforce his patents over a time-saving 
turning lathe that permitted wood to be shaped into irregular forms such as gun stocks and tool 
handles, he had to go to the venues of the woodworkers he accused of infringement, in 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and other locations.14 
This remained the rule of the land even after 1875, when diversity and removal 
jurisdiction was added. But the 1875 Act expanded jurisdiction of federal courts, whereas state 
                                                          
13  Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73), § 11 (“And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts 
against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an 
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ. . . .”); Chaffee v. Hayward, 61 US 208, 212 
(1858). 
14 Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 Yale L.J. 848, 860-61 n. 41-48 (2015). 
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courts had previously heard many cases when both parties were in the same state.15 Following 
this rule change, suits could still be filed wherever defendants inhabited or could be found.16 
While the rule was the same, the practical effect was broader than the habitation requirement 
because defendants were “found” essentially anywhere there was a business presence.17 This 
development coincided with the rise of the patent “sharks,” patentholders that sued farmers 
for their use of farming implements such as sliding gates, barbed fences and drywall.18 The 
ability to consolidate multiple suits in a single venue led Congressman Nathaniel C. Deering of 
Iowa to report in 1879 that: 
“a single attorney is preparing papers for more than one thousand cases; and that the 
attorneys for the patentee of the iron barbs for wire-fences are preparing papers for 
upward of four thousand cases. . . our State. Hundreds, if not thousands of the unwary 
and unsuspecting farmers in my district will no doubt be compelled, by threats and 
intimidation, either to yield to the extortionate demands of these plunderers, and pay 
$10 or $20 each . . . or be dragged one hundred and fifty miles away from their homes, 
at great inconvenience and expense.”19 
Note that these individuals were being sued in their home districts, and that the long distances 
were due to rural farm locations but consider if they had all been sued 2,000 or more miles 
from their homes. Even during this time, where a patent case could be brought had an 
influence on its outcome. 
This early period of permissive venue came to an end about a decade after it started 
when, in 188720 and 1888,21 Congress passed a revision that generally narrowed venue, but in a 
complex way. Under the new rule, if a case was brought under what was then federal question 
jurisdiction, then the suit could only be brought where the defendant inhabited. But in diversity 
cases (e.g. a case worth more than $500 but less than $2,000 with parties in different states), 
plaintiffs could sue either where they resided or where the defendant resided. But in either 
case, defendants could no longer be sued where they were found, only where they inhabited.  
However, for the first ten years of the new statute, courts were confused about the law’s 
                                                          
15 Jurisdiction & Removal Act of Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, § 1; Federal Judiciary Center, Landmark 
Judicial Legislation: The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_11.html. 
16 Federal Judiciary Center, Id. (“[T]he act of 1875 attracted new types of litigation that swelled the caseload of the 
federal courts and challenged the existing organization of the judiciary.”). 
17 Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 US 369, 376 (1877) (“They have in express terms, in consideration of a grant of the 
privilege of doing business within the State, agreed that they may be sued there.”). 
18 Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875-1888, 34 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 59, 73 (1947). 
19 Id. at 68.  
20 Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, § 1 
21 Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433 § 1 (“[N]o civil suit shall be brought . . . against any person . . . in any 
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the 
action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the 
plaintiff or the defendant.”). 
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applicability to patent cases. Eventually, the Supreme Court determined that, because district 
court jurisdiction to hear patent cases arose under a different statute, the general venue 
provision did not apply; venue in patent cases was permissible essentially anywhere.22  
In response to this trend, in 1897, Congress clarified its intent that patent defendants 
should be sued only where they inhabited or where they had a place of business and 
committed infringing acts.23 This patent venue rule was narrower than the free-for-all, but still 
broader than the inhabitant rule applicable to other cases. In one sense, it was a return to 
venue where the defendant might be found, with the added proviso that the infringement also 
take place in the selected district. In fact, the statute explicitly provided for service at other 
business locations, just as the “found” jurisdiction did.24 
Meanwhile, Congress continued to tinker with the general venue rules, enacting a 
provision that allowed broader venue in the case of two defendants in civil cases; in fact, that 
rule pre-dated the 1897 patent venue rule.25 The Supreme Court confirmed in the 1942 Stonite 
case that these general venue rules did not undermine application of the special, narrower 
venue rules to patent cases, in large part because the recodification of the general rules did not 
trump the special rule.26   
But additional changes introduced additional ambiguity. In 1948, the Judicial Code was 
recodified to its current form, which specifies in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), rather succinctly, that 
patent venue is proper “in the judicial district where the defendant resides (rather than 
inhabits), or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.” A related provision of the law, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), was revised 
to state that a corporate defendant resides anywhere it is doing business, essentially restoring 
the broader concept of venue being proper anywhere a corporate defendant could be found.27  
The two changes implied a potential new meaning – that “reside” no longer meant 
“inhabit,” or place of incorporation, for patent venue. This new ambiguity brought another 
Supreme Court case about a decade later, considering again whether the new general rule 
modified the special patent rule. The very small difference between § 1400(b) and § 1391(c) 
made a big difference to a West Virginia glass company called Fourco that was sued in New 
                                                          
22 In re Hohorst, 150 US 653, 663-64 (1893). See also Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 US 561, 564 n.3 
(1942). 
23 Act of March 3, 1897, c. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (“. . .the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any 
district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have committed acts of 
infringement and have a regular and established place of business.”). 
24 Id. 
25  Act of May 4, 1858, c. 27, 11 Stat. 272; R.S. § 740; Judicial Code § 52. 
26 Stonite Products, 315 US at 567  (“Even assuming that R.S. § 740 covered patent litigation prior to the Act of 
1897, we do not think that its application survived that act, which was intended to define the exact limits of venue 
in patent infringement suits.”). 
27 Note, Federal Venue and the Corporate Plaintiff: Judicial Code Section 1391 (c), 28 Ind. L.J. 256 (1953). 
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York.28 The company had a place of business in New York, and thus was doing business there, 
but was not committing infringing acts there.29 In other words, though Fourco could be found in 
New York, it did not inhabit the state, making the suit proper only if § 1391(c) had redefined the 
contours of patent venue as set forth in the § 1400(b). 
 
In its 1957 decision, the Supreme Court determined that § 1391(c) was a general statute 
that had not actually changed the patent landscape or the vision of limited patent venue set 
forth by the Court in the Stonite case.30 Because § 1400(b) is a specific prior statute, nothing 
indicated that Congress intended to change the meaning of § 1400(b), the Court reasoned. The 
term “resides” in § 1400(b) continued to mean “inhabit” as it always had. 
 
Ironically, despite fixed language, the relative breadth of patent venue changed with 
Congress’s whims in other parts of the statute. When first passed as a response to unfettered 
venue choices, for the period from 1897 until § 1391(c) was passed in 1948, the patent rule 
provided for relatively broad venue compared to nonpatent cases, which limited filings to place 
of habitation. But as Congress returned to unfettered venue choices for nonpatent cases, 
patent venue began to look somewhat narrower. 
 
It is within this context that the current dispute over patent venue appears in many 
ways to be history repeating itself. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) has remained unchanged since 
1948, the Congressional provisions governing general venue have undergone two additional 
revisions. In 1988, a new clause was added to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)’s definition of residence, 
resulting in the following language: “For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that 
is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to 
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” (emphasis added). These three 
words, the Federal Circuit held in its 1990 VE Holding case, triggered a change in how § 1400(b) 
should be interpreted because the patent venue rule was “under this chapter.”31 As a result, 
patentholders could sue alleged infringers in “any district where there would be personal 
jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.” Thus was born the current era of permissive venue 
for patents, joining other civil cases.  
 
Not content to leave venue alone, in 2011, Congress amended § 1391 again. There were 
two primary changes. First, § 1391(a) now says the section will apply to venue in all civil actions, 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law." Second, instead of "under this chapter," § 1391(c) now 
reads, “For all venue purposes.”  
 
The courts have not adjusted their interpretation of patent venue law, but should they? 
Whether the general venue statute should trump patent venue rules has been before the court 
                                                          
28 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 US 222, 223 (1957). 
29 Id. at 223. 
30 Id. at 228-29. 
31 VE Holding Corp v Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed Cir 1990). 
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several times since 1887, and it is one of the questions that was presented to the Federal 
Circuit in the TC Heartland case, described in further detail below. 
 
Filing Trends 
Though VE Holding expanded venue in patent cases, permissive venue is not unique to 
patent law. Indeed, as Clermont and Eisenberg have observed, “the American way is to provide 
plaintiffs with a wide choice of venues for suit.”32 Scholars have studied, critiqued, and 
defended strategic forum choices in several areas of law, including mass torts and bankruptcy 
in modern times; there is even evidence from the 1600s that suggests that English judges made 
jurisdictional, procedural, and doctrinal choices to attract plaintiffs.33 A comprehensive study of 
transfer motions in the 1980s and 1990s found that cases that were successfully transferred to 
the defendant’s preferred venue were much less likely to result in a victory for the plaintiff.34 
But while permissive venue is not unique to patent law, among federal causes of action 
– besides bankruptcy35 – forum shopping in patents has attracted the most attention.36 In 2001, 
Professor Kimberly Moore (now a judge on the Federal Circuit) published an empirical study 
showing that the five most popular districts at the time for patent litigation (the Central and 
Northern Districts of California, the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of New 
York, and the District of Massachusetts) collectively accounted for only 15% of all civil case 
                                                          
32 Kevin. M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1507 (1995). 
As noted in the Introduction, though, it was not always the American way.     
33 Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007). 
34 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note ___, at 1507 (finding, based on a study of 2.8 million terminations of federal 
civil cases between 1979 and 1991, a disparity in win rates among transferred and nontransferred cases of 29% 
versus 58%, respectively). 
35 Relevant articles include: Barry E. Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the “Delawarization of Bankruptcy” Debate, 52 
Emory L.J. 1309, 1316–17 (2003) (questioning whether the observed number of bankruptcies filed in Delaware 
differs that greatly from a random walk),; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum 
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 11 (finding that a 
substantial number of bankruptcy cases were filed in districts where the company had little or no physical 
presence); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in 
Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 967 (1999) (documenting and explaining the abrupt shift in 
1990 when forum shoppers stopped filing in New York and started filing in Delaware); Samir D. Parikh, Modern 
Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 159 (2013) (finding 69% of the largest bankruptcy cases filed 
between 2007 and 2012 were “forum shopped”). See also Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based 
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 425, 432–33 (2006) (acknowledging 
the high number of filings in Delaware while critiquing Prof. LoPucki’s explanations for it). 
36 A search of forum shopping commentary in the context of copyright, trademark, antitrust, and civil RICO 
literature revealed only one empirical study, which found out of hometown forum shopping substantially less 
prevalent in copyright and trademark litigation than in patent litigation. See Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. 
District Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1065, 1095–97 (2016). Outside of the federal courts, commentators 
have also considered forum shopping in the context of mass tort cases. See,e.g., Craig S. Hilliard and Martin P. 
Schrama, A Case Study on the Importance of  Forum Selection in Mass Tort Litigation, 200 N.J.L.J. 382 (May 17, 
2010).37 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 
N.C. L. Rev. 889, 903–04 (2001). 
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terminations but 29% of patent case terminations from 1995-99.37  Moreover, although the 
clusters of filings within certain districts appeared to correlate with their proximity to large 
numbers of patent-seeking companies and their headquarters, others popular districts 
including the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Virginia did not.38  Rather, filings 
appeared to correlate (albeit not uniformly) with procedural advantages such as time to trial 
and with differential win rates.39   
Over the past ten or so years, however, while the District of Delaware has grown to be 
the second most popular forum for patent litigation (Virginia’s popularity having declined for a 
variety of reasons),40 patent suits increasingly have clustered in the Eastern District of Texas. 
Table 1 below charts the raw numbers of patent actions filed in the Eastern District, beginning 
in 1999 (when there were only 14 actions) through the first half of 2016, when there were 767 
patent filings.   
Table 1:  Patent Cases Filed in the Eastern District of Texas41  
  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
14 23 33 32 55 108 159 196 358 
  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 1st Half 
2016 
289 235 283 414 1247 1494 1425 2540 767 
  
 
 
Of greater interest, however, is Table 2, which, based on data from Lex Machina and 
various academic studies, lists the patent caseload of the leading federal district courts by 
percentages.  In 2015, approximately 44% of all U.S. patent infringement actions were filed in the 
                                                          
37 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. 
Rev. 889, 903–04 (2001). 
38 Delaware is a popular state for incorporation, but not many of the corporations incorporated in Delaware actually 
have their principal place of business there.39 See Moore, supra note 6, at 904–23. 
39 See Moore, supra note 6, at 904–23. 
40 See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241,  280–81 (2016) (discussing factors that 
contributed to Delaware and Virginia’s popularity, and the more recent adoption of measures intended to 
discourage overuse of Virginia as a forum, leading to its decline). 
41 Sources: for data from 1999-2006, Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction:  An Empirical Study of the 
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 1 
(2007); for data from 2007-13, Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241, 249 tbl. 1 (2016); 
for 2014, Brian Howard, 2014 Patent Litigation Year in Review at 5, Lex Machina, March 26, 2015, available at 
http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/lexmachina/images/2014%20Patent%20Litigation%20Report.pdf; for 2015, Brian 
Howard, 2015 First Half Patent Case Filing Trends, Lex Machina, July 14, 2015, available at 
https://lexmachina.com/2015-first-half-patent-case-filing-trends/. Note that jump from 2011 to 2012 is explained 
in large part by joinder rule changes in the AIA, explained in the text at note __.   
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Eastern District of Texas.42 The Eastern District courts also decide the largest proportion of NPE 
patent cases.43 In 2016, this share dropped to 30% in the first quarter44 and 37% in the second 
quarter.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 For the third quarter of 2015, Lex Machina reports a drop in filings nationally, to 1,119, of which only 435 were 
filed in the Eastern District.  Through the first three quarters of 2015, then, the district’s share of patent cases comes 
to 1822/4255, just under 43%.  See Brian Howard, Q3 2015 IP Filing Trends, Lex Machina, Oct. 9, 2015, 
https://lexmachina.com/q3-2015-ip-filing-trends/. 
43 John R. Allison et al., How Often Do Non-Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits?, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 
2016). 
44 Brian Howard, 2016 First Quarter IP Litigation Trends, Lex Machina, April 13, 2016, 
https://lexmachina.com/2016-first-quarter-ip-litigation-trends/ 
45 Brian Howard, 2016 Second Quarter IP Litigation Trends, Lex Machina, July 14, 2016, 
https://lexmachina.com/2016-second-quarter-ip-litigation-trends/ 
Table 2: Top 10 Most Popular Districts for Patent Cases, 2007-2016 (% of Total Cases) 
 
District 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1st 
Half 
2007-
First 
Half 
2016 
Eastern 
District of 
Texas 
1% 2% 4% 6% 10% 13% 11% 9% 10% 12% 23% 24% 28% 44% 34% 20% 
District of 
Delaware 
5% 5% 6% 5% 5% 6% 6% 9% 9% 14% 18% 22% 19% 9% 9% 12% 
Central 
District of 
California 
10% 16% 11% 9% 10% 12% 8% 11% 8% 9% 9% 7% 7% 5% 7% 8% 
Northern 
District of 
California 
8% 7% 7% 7% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 
Northern 
District of 
Illinois 
7% 6% 7% 5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 6% 6% 4% 4% 3% 3% 6% 5% 
District of 
New Jersey 
4% 5% 4% 4% 6% 7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 3% 2% 6% 5% 5% 5% 
Southern 
District of 
New York 
4% 5% 6% 5% 4% 4% 5% 6% 4% 4% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 
Southern 
District of 
California 
3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 4% 2% 1% 3% 2% 
Southern 
District of 
Florida 
* * * * * 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2% 4% 2% 
District of 
Massachusetts 
* * * * * 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
National Total 2527 2744 2772 2523 2600 2775 2573 2547 2769 3574 5454 6115 5077 5830 2240 38,954 
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It is important to acknowledge that some of the growth in the share of cases in the 
Eastern District was due to the joinder rule changes in the AIA, which required that cases 
against separate defendants be brought in separate actions rather than a single consolidated 
action with as many as 100 defendants. Because the Eastern District of Texas is favored by 
NPEs, and because NPEs tend to sue more defendants at once,46 the jump from 2011 to 2012 
reflects expected growth in the Eastern District, both in absolute numbers and in comparison to 
other districts. This does not downplay the significance of the Eastern District of Texas after 
2012; it merely shows that it had been busy for a few years before that.47 
The concentration of cases does not stop at the district court level. The Eastern District’s 
longstanding practice is to assign judges to hear cases based on the division within the district 
in which the action is filed, rather than randomly assigning a judge as is more typical.48 Under 
the court’s most recent General Order, for example, Chief Judge Clark is assigned 100% of the 
patent actions filed in the Beaumont Division and 50% in the Sherman Division, while Judge 
Gilstrap is assigned 80% of all civil litigation filed in Marshall and 30% of the patent cases filed in 
Tyler; all of the remaining Tyler patent matters are assigned to Judge Schroeder.49  This policy 
explains how some repeat litigants manage to have all of their cases assigned to the same 
judge.50  It also explains how one single judge, Judge Gilstrap, wound up being assigned 982 
patent actions in 2014—just under one-fifth of all the patent infringement actions filed in the 
entire United States that year.51 Presumably, patentees might like the reliability of knowing the 
presiding judge, for good or bad. At worst, to the extent that plaintiffs believe a certain judge 
will be favorable, this rule would encourage fine-grained selection of forum. At best, 
overloading a few judges is more likely to cause delays from overburden. 
The long-standing tendency of patent plaintiffs to pick favorable venues, though often 
overlooked, raises an important but largely ignored first order question: are there real benefits 
to the Eastern District of Texas? Are those advantages enduring? Or might this district, like 
other previously popular patent districts, decline on its own over time? In the following 
                                                          
46 Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 67, 82 (2015). See generally Christopher 
Anthony Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 Minn. L. Rev. 649 (2014). 
47 Sag, supra note __(5), at ___.48 See Anderson, supra note __, at 671-74; Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 254-
256. 
48 See Anderson, supra note __, at 671-74; Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 254-256. 
49 See U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Tex. General Order 14-20, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=24811.  The court does occasionally deviate by assigning selected patent cases 
to designated senior judges from other districts, however.   
50 See Anderson, supra note __, at 673 (citing Leychkis’s 2007 paper, supra note __, at 215 tbl.8, for the proposition 
that “since 1999, Data Treasury Corporation, Orion IP, and IAP Intermodal have collectively filed thirty-seven 
patent suits in the district,” each “before a single judge,” respectively Judges Folsom, Davis, and Ward). 
51 See Howard, supra note __, at 15.     
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paragraphs we discuss what the district’s procedures and practices to date suggest about 
whether its outsized influence is likely to continue in the future.  
It is not completely clear why the Eastern District became the venue of choice in the first 
place. A comprehensive study of district court procedures and outcomes did not list it among 
the top 6 places to file a lawsuit in terms of win rate or in terms of aggregate rankings.52 
Instead, nearby Northern District of Texas had by far the best win rate from 2000-2010. And the 
District of Delaware was more likely to send a case to trial.53 Time to trial is only the seventh 
best and median damages are only the fifth best, less than half of the fourth best.54 The best 
district for combined time to trial, success rate, and median damages award remains the 
Eastern District of Virginia.55 Nonetheless, for the 17 years between 1978 and 2005, no Eastern 
District of Texas jury found in favor of a defendant.56 News of this pattern likely became more 
widespread and is reflected in the growth in 2005 and beyond. 
Putting aside outcomes, the Eastern District's local procedures and people have also 
been a draw. Some of these procedures are longstanding, while others were developed in the 
courtroom of Judge Ward before being adopted more widely.57 The Eastern District has 
maintained relatively short times to trial (though with the increase in its caseload, the district’s 
advantage along this metric has declined).58 Perhaps more important is early and generous 
discovery coupled with a docket busy enough that it is difficult to have dispositive motions 
heard quickly.59 The Eastern District also has a reputation for refusing to decide summary 
                                                          
52 Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 (2010). 
53 Id. at 12. 
54 See Barry et al., supra note __, at 15 (reporting that from 1999-2014, median damages in the Eastern District 
have been just under $9 million, ranking fifth nationally but well ahead of the national median of $5.4 million); 
Brian Howard, Lex Machina Patent Litigation Damages Report, 25 (2015) 
(http://pages.lexmachina.com/rs/lexmachina/images/2014%20Patent%20Litigation%20Report.pdf) (reporting 
that, from 2005 through 2014, median damages in the Eastern District ranked third nationally, at $8,710,000, 
based on 89 cases).55  Barry et al., supra note __, at 15. 
55  Barry et al., supra note __, at 15. 
56 Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases: Marshall's Response to TS Tech 
and Genetech, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 61, 71 (2010).  
57 See Anderson, supra note __, at 651-52 (2015) (noting that the district’s short discovery timeline of nine months 
and its strictly-maintained “discovery deadlines and trial dates . . . allow[ed] plaintiffs to impose a strict timeline on 
often overwhelmed defendants.”); Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 250, 266 & m.140. 
58 See note ___ and accompanying text. 
Id. at 10-11. 
59 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 269 (stating that, in the Eastern District, “parties must produce all 
documents ‘that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses involved in this action’ in conjunction with initial 
disclosures and without awaiting a discovery request,” and that “[d]efendants must complete their document 
collection and production – probably the most costly aspect of discovery – within a few months of the case filing”). 
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judgment motions,60 which is likely at least indirectly tied to win rates and settlement pressure 
in that district.  Its juries have a reputation of awarding generous damages in patent cases.61   
And while the win rate is no longer what it was in 2005, parties in the Eastern District 
continue to see greater success than in other districts. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC), non-practicing entities (NPEs) had a 49% win rate there over a 20 year period, in 
comparison with a 26% average win rate in other high-volume districts.62 Ashtor and others 
find that, as of 2011, historic win rates for patent assertion entities (PAEs) were highest in the 
Eastern District among districts that decided more than five cases.63 Allison, Lemley, and 
Schwartz report that for cases filed in 2008-09, plaintiffs won and decided in 2010 or later 45% 
of suits overall and 72% of cases that went to trial compared with a 26% and 61% success rates, 
respectively, nationally.64  Their study’s multivariate regression analysis concludes that the 
Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware “were both significantly more likely to rule 
for the patentee in the cases we studied than were the ‘non-busy’ patent districts.”65 The 
Eastern District’s benefits have not been limited to NPE plaintiffs. PwC also reports that the win 
rate for patent plaintiffs generally in the Eastern District for 1995-2014 was even higher than 
the NPE win rate, and highest in the nation among the leading fifteen patent venues, at 55%,66  
with almost twice as many decisions relating to non-NPEs as to NPEs. In theory, of course, a 
                                                          
60 See id., supra note __, at 252, tbl. 2, & appx. 2 (showing that despite a larger docket, court ruled on far fewer 
summary judgment motions).  Reporting the results of studies by Iancu & Chung and by Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, 
Klerman and Reilly also note that as of 2011 and 2014: 
“The infrequency of summary judgment is not just the result of fewer motions by the parties. The 
Eastern District is far less likely to grant a summary judgment motion than elsewhere. One study 
found that the Eastern District’s summary judgment motion win rate (26.2%) paled in comparison 
to other popular districts, like the Northern District of California (45%), the Central District of 
California (48.2%), the Northern District of Illinois (38.1%), and even the District of Delaware (32%). 
Another more comprehensive study found that accused infringers prevail on summary judgment 
on patent invalidity only 18% of the time in the Eastern District of Texas, compared to 31% 
nationwide. Similarly, patent defendants prevail on noninfringement motions 45% of the time in 
the Eastern District, but 62% nationwide.” 
61 See BARRY ET AL., supra note __, at 15 (reporting that from 1999-2014, median damages in the Eastern District have 
been just under $9 million, ranking fifth nationally but well ahead of the national median of $5.4 million); OWEN BYRD 
ET AL., LEX MACHINA PATENT LITIGATION DAMAGES REPORT, 24 (2014) (reporting that, from January 1, 2000 through 
December 31, 2013, median damages in the district ranked third nationally, at $8,250,000, based on 84 cases).   
62 See BARRY ET AL., supra note __,, at 16 (comparing outcomes in the Eastern District of Texas with the other 20 
districts with five or more such suits). Note that Delaware had a 35% win rate, and the Northern District of California 
had a 16% win rate. It should be noted that the number is very small, however: 55 final NPE decisions over a period 
of 20 years, given NPEs’ high rate of settlement. 
63 Jonathan H. Ashtor et al., Patents at Issue: The Data Behind the Patent Troll Debate, 21 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 957, 
959 (2014). See also Barry et al. supra note ___, at 16. 
64 See Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note __, at 1793-94. 
65 See id. at 1791-94.  
66 See id. at 15 (reporting an “overall success rate” of 55% from 1995-2014). See also Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact 
of Local Patent Rules on Rate and Timing of Case Resolution Relative to Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the 
Past Decade, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 451, 483 (2013) (reporting a 38% win rate in the Eastern District and a 43% win rate 
in the District of Delaware). 
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higher win rate could reflect the selection effect of higher-quality patents being asserted in a 
particular venue; though given the very large numbers of cases filed in the district, it might 
seem odd for the average quality of the patents litigated there to be significantly above the 
norm.   
Where We are Headed 
Current Trends 
Assuming the favorable procedures and outcomes caused the concentration of cases 
today (a safe bet), are they likely to do so in the future? While the majority of this paper 
considers this question in view of proposed venue reforms, in the next few paragraphs we 
consider how filing trends might evolve in the absence of any venue reform. Even as venue law 
has largely stood still in the last few years, the rest of patent law has not. The Supreme Court’s 
Alice decision has narrowed the scope of patentable subject matter, rendering a large number 
of existing patents invalid.67 Procedures for challenging patents introduced by the 2011 
America Invents Act, in particular, inter partes review, have become more popular.68 A pair of 
Supreme Court cases has made it easier for prevailing parties to recoup their fees.69 These and 
related developments have generally favored defendants regardless of district (though not all 
recent developments have),70 resulting in high profile defense victories even in the Eastern 
District. For example, in 2015, Judge Gilstrap simultaneously terminated 168 cases on summary 
judgment, and then awarded attorneys’ fees against the plaintiff.71 In fact, though judges still 
rule on summary judgment less often, plaintiffs only win 14% of the time when counting from 
2000-June 2015.72 
Thus, while 2015 saw a record number of both total cases and share of cases filed in the 
Eastern District, 2016 has seen a decline in both figures from these peaks. Total cases were 
down 30% in the first quarter of 2016 from 2015 levels,73 and the share of Eastern District cases 
was down to 30% of the total, from 44% of the total in 2015. In the second quarter, cases were 
                                                          
67 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (finding abstract ideas implemented on a computer 
ineligible for patent protection). 
68 See Colleen Chien and Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-Grant Patent Reviews, 
Stanford Tech. L.  Rev. *3 n.2 (2016) (noting the rise in inter partes petitions from 514 in 2013 to 1310 in 2014.) In 
2015, the number was 1737. Cyrus Morton et al., Takeaways from PTAB’s Fiscal Year Statistics, Law360 (January 3, 
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/740962/takeaways-from-ptab-s-fiscal-year-statistics. 
69 See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (relaxing the standard for 
finding a case to be “exceptional” and fee shifting); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc. 134 
S. Ct. 1744, 1748–1749 (2014) (finding that fee decisions should be subject to an abuse of discretion, rather than 
de novo, review). 
70 Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., __ U.S. __ (2016) (easing standard to prove willful infringement). 
71 Joe Mullin, In a first, East Texas judge hits patent troll with attorneys’ fees, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 20, 2015), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/12/in-a-first-east-texas-judge-hits-patent-troll-with-attorneys-fees/. 
72 Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at appx. 2. 
73  See Howard, supra note 11. 
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down 23% from 201574 although the share of Eastern District cases rose from the 1Q to 2Q, to 
37%.75  
It’s too early to tell based on the numbers whether or not the share and number of 
cases in the Eastern District is on a long-term downward trend. However, two other data points 
can provide clues: how policy efforts that were intended or anticipated to reduce case 
concentration in the district, in the areas of transfer and joinder, have fared, and the impact on 
the district of the change to the patent system described earlier.  
If the “American way” is to provide plaintiffs with their choice of venue, an important 
safeguard within the US system against abusive forum shopping is the ability to transfer a case 
after it has been filed.76 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states that “[f]or the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought . . . .” For a number of years, however, the 
Eastern District had a reputation for being unusually hostile to motions to transfer.77 But in a 
series of cases starting in 2008, the Fifth Circuit and Federal Circuit granted writs of mandamus 
– extraordinary orders – to overturn transfer denials out of the Eastern District of Texas, 
explicitly laying out when the transferee venue was “clearly more convenient,” and the case 
should be transferred there.78 In the few years following the decisions, commentators 
predicted the end of “forum shopping in general – and the Eastern District of Texas 
phenomenon in particular.”79 But that’s not what happened.  
Though one might have expected that the overall transfer rate would increase since the 
TS Tech decision, the transfer rate actually has declined.80 This may be in part because litigants 
have adjusted their behavior and only filed in the Eastern District when cases meet the newly 
articulated standard. But a change in behavior cannot explain the whole story – the Federal 
Circuit has, since the TS Tech decision, granted petitions for mandamus thirteen times 
compelling the Eastern District to transfer patent litigation elsewhere – a striking number.81  By 
comparison, since its founding the Federal Circuit appears to have denied all but one such 
petition seeking transfer out of any other district court. 82 Since late 2008, the district’s share of 
                                                          
74 See Howard, supra note 12, at Fig. 1 (reflecting that 1,666 cases were filed in 2Q2015 vs. 1252 in 2Q2016). 
75 Id. 
76 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note ___ at 1509.  
77 See Offen-Brown, supra note ___, at 62–63. See also Anderson, supra note __, at 675-76.  
78 Id. See Offen-Brown, supra note ___, at 75–85 (describing the TS Tech,VW, and Genentech cases). 
79 Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-
Practicing Entities, 19 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 29, 32 (2010) 
80 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 262.     
81 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 346 & n.8 (2012) (identifying ten 
successful motions for mandamus between 2008 and 2011).  Since then, by our count there have been at least six 
(6) more (In re Google; In re Nintendo; In re TOA Tech; In re Toyota; EON Corp IP Holdings v Apple; In re Broadcom 
Corp/Qualcomm/Azure).   
82 See id. at 346 n.10, 347 n.16. 
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cases has increased markedly.  Plaintiffs appear willing to roll the dice that their cases will not 
be transferred and that such a decision will withstand appeal. 
Another policy intervention that was intended to target the Eastern District addressed 
the numbers of defendants sued there. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) states that 
defendants can be sued jointly when a claim arises “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences.”83 From the mid-1990s, the Eastern District (among other 
districts) interpreted this rule liberally, allowing makers of different products to be sued jointly, 
absent evidence that the defendants’ products were “dramatically different.”84 As a result, and 
given NPE propensity to sue multiple defendants at a time,85 one study found the estimated 
number of defendants in actions filed in the Eastern District of Texas went “from 1.66 in 1994 
to 12.37 in 2010,” while the national average over that period generally hovered between two 
and four, with the exception of the last year when it went to 4.31.86  Moreover, while only the 
Eastern District represented only 10% of 2010 patent cases, it accounted for 25% of all patent 
defendants.87  
One impact of liberal joinder is to reduce the patentee’s costs by enabling patentees to 
capture economies of scale. However, it can also put the squeeze on defendants, as “courts 
typically do not increase the time for presenting evidence during a trial by a multiple of the 
number of defendants who are sued… Each defendant was given a sharply abbreviated amount 
of time to present its case, despite the fact that most, if not all, of the defendants made 
different products whose alleged infringement of the patent presented different factual 
questions,” (citations omitted) as one of the staffers behind the AIA put it.88  When Congress 
had the opportunity to amend patent law in 2011, it enacted a stricter joinder rule for patent 
                                                          
83 Rule 20(a)(2) states that “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if:  (A) any right to relief is 
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants 
will arise in the action.” 
84 The leading case, authored by Judge Leonard Davis, was MyMail, Ltd. v. America Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. 
Tex. 2004). 
85 Risch, supra note 13, at 82 tbl. 1 , 92 fig.2 (showing growth in NPE and non-NPE defendant counts in districts 
throughout country between 1986 and 2009). 
86 See Sag, supra note __, at 1082 tbl. 3, 1084. Another study reported that the average number of defendants in a 
patent infringement action filed in the Eastern District in 2010 was thirteen, compared to between two and four in 
other leading districts.  See James Pistorino, Concentration of Patent Cases in Eastern District of Texas Increases in 
2010, 81 BNA PAT. COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 803, 805-06 (Apr. 15, 2011).  Yet another reports a mean of 9.1 and a 
median of 4 defendants in patent actions filed in the district from January 1, 2008 to September 15, 2011 (the date 
on which the AIA was enacted), compared with 2.4 and 1 in the Central District of California.  See David O. Taylor, 
Patent Misjoinder, 88 NYU L. Rev. 652, 726 tbl. 1 (2013).  The mean number of defendants with an identified tie 
(defined as incorporation, headquarters, principal place of business, or residency) to the Eastern District was 1.2; 
the median was 0.  See id. at 724 n.309, 726 tbl. 1.   
87 See Pistorino, supra note __, at 805-06. 
88 Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 539, 592 
(2012).89 See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (parties that are accused infringers may be joined in one action as defendants . . . only 
if any right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising 
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. . . .”).  
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cases89 with “the Eastern District of Texas’s interpretation of Rule 20… [and the] substantial 
denial of due process to defendants” – or at least the perception of it - in mind.90 But while the 
average number of defendants per patent infringement suit filed in the Eastern District fell to 
1.99 in 2014,91 this reflected plaintiffs adjusting, rather than fundamentally changing, their 
behavior in an entirely predictable way: they now sued few defendants in many separate cases 
instead of many defendants in few cases. Furthermore, whatever benefits accrued from not 
having to coordinate (which are difficult to measure, as multiple cases were still often related 
for claim construction) may have been offset by the cost to small defendants who could 
previously rely on larger defendants to keep a large consolidated defense going but now each 
had to seek counsel to take the lead. Patent lawsuits continued to grow, and the total number 
of patent defendants sued in the Eastern District grew disproportionately with it, with the 2015 
total defendants exceeding the 2010 total.92  
These two examples show how the Eastern District has continued to attract and grow its 
caseload despite developments that have restricted which cases and which defendants can be 
named in suits there. Why has the venue’s popularity persisted? There are at least a few 
plausible explanations. First, that plaintiffs have adapted their behavior as the new rules have 
required – in the case of joinder, for example, bringing more cases to compensate for the fewer 
number of permissible defendants per case. Whether plaintiffs can do that in response to a 
particular intervention depends on the specifics, however. The second explanation is that, even 
though developments like TS Tech make certain cases harder to justify keeping in the Eastern 
District, they do not fundamentally change the calculus when plaintiffs are deciding to bring 
their cases, in light of the many advantages that the forum has. The third explanation might be 
that even as rules have changed, they provide discretion to district courts for supporting the 
implementation of rules in a way that maintains the venue’s comparative advantages over 
other jurisdictions.93 
These explanations may provide clues as to how the Eastern District will fare – assuming 
venue rules are undisturbed – in light of the more challenging climate that patent plaintiffs are 
now experiencing. As described earlier, the Supreme Court has made it easier to award 
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties and to invalidate patents as claiming impermissible subject 
matter. Defendants can request reviews of patents that are asserted against them using new 
post-grant procedures, and seek stays of parallel district court litigation. The Eastern District 
has changed its behavior accordingly. But consistent with its reputation, the data suggest that 
                                                          
89 See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (parties that are accused infringers may be joined in one action as defendants . . . only if any 
right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. . . .”).  
90 Matal, supra note__, at 592.   
91 See Sag, supra note __, at 1084. 
92 For the total 2010 figure of 3501, see Sag, supra note __, at 120 (noting the average number of defendants sued 
in the ED of Texas in 2010 as 12.37); Klerman & Reilly supra note __, at 249 (noting 283 total cases in 2010).  
93 We do not speculate in this article about why the Eastern District may seek to maintain its pro-plaintiff edge, but 
note that other commentators have identified judicial interest in patent cases, the positive impact of case 
concentration on the local economy, and post-bench career opportunities as possible motives. See e.g. Klerman 
and Reilly, supra note ___ at 270–277 and Anderson, supra note ___ at 661–666. 
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the Eastern District implemented these pro-defendant changes in a pro-plaintiff way relative to 
other districts, at least initially. As one report stated: “on awards of attorneys' fees post Octane 
Fitness, in 2015, the Eastern District of Texas granted only 9 percent of such motions, as 
compared to 33 percent nationwide. And, on §101 challenges, in 2015, the court granted (or 
partially granted) only 33 percent of all motions to find asserted patents ineligible, as compared 
to 64 percent nationwide.”94 In the three years following the availability of the AIA’s post-grant 
review processes, the district granted requests to stay the district court litigation 48% of the 
time, as compared to 58% of the time nationwide.95 Though it is possible that the Eastern 
District’s relatively lower § 101 summary judgment, stay and fee-shifting rates are an artifact of 
the cases that are filed there, plaintiff friendly local rules and applications of the law have been 
blamed as well.96 For example, Judge Gilstrap of the Eastern District initially set forth, though 
quickly withdrew, a process that made it difficult for litigants to file § 101 challenges.97  
 
There is reason to believe that these differences may diminish to some degree in the 
future. For example, though the Eastern District denied all fee-shifting requests in 2015, in the 
first four months of 2016, it granted three out of 10 of them, in line with national norms.98 
Likewise, Judge Gilstrap of the Eastern District, who himself has decided an outsized number of 
cases, has suggested that he is evolving his practice.99 But regardless, as long as the District’s 
implementations of these developments does not fundamentally change the calculus when 
plaintiffs are deciding to bring their cases – which would only happen if, on net, Texas became 
less attractive to plaintiffs than plaintiffs’ other options –– it is likely that plaintiffs will continue 
to select the district over those other options. 
 
                                                          
94 Lionel M. Lavenue et al., De Facto Patent Reform In The Eastern District Of Texas, Law360 (January 29, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/750017/de-facto-patent-reform-in-the-eastern-district-of-texas. See also Nirav 
Desai & Lauren Johnson, Octane Fitness, Two Years On: How It Has Impacted District Courts’ Award of Attorneys’ 
Fees in Patent Cases, Legal Backgrounder, Washington Legal Foundation at *4 (April 29, 2016) 
(http://www.skgf.com/uploads/1455/doc/Octane_Fitness_two_years_on_how_it_has_impacted_district_courts_a
ward_of_attorneys_fees_in_patent_cases_(Desai_and_Johnson)_Washington_Legal_Foundation_April_2016.pdf) 
(reporting that in the first year following the Octane Fitness decision, the Eastern District granted none of the 13 
motions for attorney’s fees motions made, but the first 4 months of 2016, they granted three of ten).   
95 Jonathan Stroud et al., Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-
Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11 Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. 226, 238 (2015). 
96 Petition for Certiorari at *5, Newegg, Inc.,v. MacroSolve, Inc., __ S.Ct. __ (2016) (arguing that the Eastern District 
has set forth an elevated standard for awarding fees). 
97  See Lavenue et al, supra note 68. 
98 See Desai & Johnson, supra note __, at *4.  
99  Ryan Davis, Gilstrap Eases Filing Of Patent Summary Judgment Motions, Law 360 (July 22, 2016) 
(http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/820536?nl_pk=131a7a57-a1ce-470e-a01f-
b1f44e413c36&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ip) (describing the changes in 
Gilstrap’s practice, including removing a requirement that litigants get his permission before seeking summary 
judgment or motions seeking to invalidate a patent under Alice, and eliminating required in-person meetings for 
litigants prior to discovery). See also Lavenue et al., supra note 68 (describing the softening of pro-plaintiff 
positions initially taken on fee-shifting, stays, and dispositive motions by ED Tex Judge Gilstrap). Both articles were 
cited in old version and both talk about his changes, so I included both. 
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Proposed Changes 
 
 Against this backdrop, at the time of this writing, there are at least two policy vehicles to 
change the venue rules, one in the courts and one in Congress. In the TC Heartland case, the 
well-known food company Kraft Foods (“Kraft”) sued plaintiff TC Heartland LLC (“Heartland”) 
for infringement of three of Kraft’s patents covering liquid water enhancers.100 Though Kraft 
has its principal place of business in Illinois, it exercised its choice of venue and sued Heartland 
in Delaware, about 700 miles away from Heartland’s home venue, the Southern District of 
Indiana.101 Heartland moved to dismiss the action or transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and 
§ 1406.  
 
According to Heartland, it has no offices, supply contracts, registered business locations, 
or permanent presence in Delaware. Its only connection to the venue, then, was that it had 
shipped orders of the accused product pursuant to two national contracts it had, amounting to 
about 2% of Heartland’s sales in 2013.102 
 
After the Delaware District Court denied Heartland’s motion, Heartland filed a 
mandamus petition asking the Federal Circuit to overrule the District’s motion. The legal 
argument Heartland advanced was that Congress’ changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) and (c) 
effectively overruled VE Holding and in effect, restored the proper interpretation of venue to 
what it was at the time of Fourco, and much closer the literal language of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), 
wherein “reside” is limited to the place of incorporation or primary place of business of a 
firm.103 The Federal Circuit denied this motion and the merits of Heartland’s argument, and 
declined Heartland’s request for en banc rehearing.  
 
Regardless of the merits of Heartland’s claim, we note that the argument was no slam 
dunk before the Federal Circuit. First, VE Holding, for better or worse, was delivered between 
the two congressional changes in 1988 and 2011. This means that Congress knew that patent 
venue was a live issue, and yet never mentioned it (or otherwise addressed it while making the 
change in 2011). In 1957, when Fourco was decided, one could argue that there had been no 
substantial change to venue rules that might override the specific meaning of patent venue. But 
that is a much taller order after two amendments that seem to broaden the general provision 
to more specifically cover § 1400(b)—and an appellate court ruling that agreed and governed 
venue for the next twenty-five years. 
 
Another approach, being pursued by certain members of Congress, would be to amend 
the federal venue statute. “Venue reform” has been a feature of Congressional acts dating back 
to at least 2008.104 The latest version of reform, the Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity 
Elimination (VENUE) Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. was introduced by Senators Jeff Flake, 
                                                          
100 In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1341–1342. 
104 See S.3600 - Patent Reform Act of 2008, section 8 (providing venue rules very similar to VENUE Act). 
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Mike Lee, and Cory Gardnerand in March 2016 and would amend § 1400 and specify 
appropriate venue in the following districts: 
 
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated; 
(2) where the defendant has committed an act of infringement of a patent in suit and 
has a regular and established physical facility that gives rise to the act of 
infringement; 
(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued in the instant action; 
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit conducted research or development 
that led to the application for the patent in suit; 
(5) where a party has a regular and established physical facility that such party controls 
and operates, not primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and has— 
(A) engaged in management of significant research and development of an 
invention claimed in a patent in suit prior to the effective filing date of the 
patent; 
(B) manufactured a tangible product that is alleged to embody an invention 
claimed in a patent in suit; or 
(C) implemented a manufacturing process for a tangible good in which the 
process is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; or 
(6) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not meet the requirements of 
paragraph (1) or (2), in accordance with section 1391(c)(3).  
Either development would aim to reduce the outsized influence of districts like East 
Texas, where few accused infringers are incorporated or are believed to have a regular and 
established place of business.   
But if plaintiffs could not choose the Eastern District, it is unclear where they would 
choose, if they had such a choice. While the discussion here has compared the Eastern District 
to national averages, districts are far from homogenous in their treatment of patents. Thus, 
while NPEs exceed the national average win rate in Texas, in the Northern District of California 
they win 16% of the time, ten percentage points below the national average of 26%.105 Even 
the overall plaintiff win rate of 26% is below the national average (33%). It is not surprising, 
then, that tech companies favor this home district, in addition to their own. And if this were a 
study of declaratory relief actions, the analysis here would likely have been that potential 
defendants in a position to choose between venues would sue in the Northern District if, 
factoring in home court advantage, they are most likely to win there. Venue is in some sense a 
zero sum game. 
One problem with retaining the state of incorporation as a possible venue, however, is 
that many large firms are incorporated in Delaware, and the District of Delaware is already the 
second most popular district and sometimes subject to criticism for being overly friendly to 
                                                          
105 See Barry et al., supra note __, at 9 fig. 9; 
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patent plaintiffs (albeit somewhat less so than the Eastern District of Texas).106 Thus, venue 
reform commentators have looked for other options. Fromer has suggested limiting venue to a 
domestic firm’s principal place of business, which she believes would “promote better 
decisionmaking . . . by tending to aggregate technology- and industry-specific patent cases in 
those districts that already have clusters of business engaging in a technology or industry,”107 
though as Klerman and Reilly note, this might give rise to a corresponding risk that defendants 
would be unduly advantaged due to home court advantages.108  Perhaps a better solution, as 
suggested by Klerman and Reilly, would be to limit venue to the district forming the largest 
market for the defendant’s allegedly infringing product,109 though it might be considerably 
more difficult for the plaintiff to ascertain in advance precisely where this is. 
As defendant states of incorporation will remain available to plaintiffs under various proposals, 
would cases merely move from Texas to Delaware if they are enacted? The hope behind these 
reforms – that the concentration of cases in the Eastern District would subside – and the fears 
that cases would just reconcentrate in Delaware can be approximated empirically. The next 
section sets out our approach for doing so.  
 
PART II 
 To understand the potential impact of various proposals, we tested them empirically. If 
the arguments made by the petitioners in the TC Heartland case are successful, patent venue 
would revert to either (1) defendant’s residency (place of incorporation) or (2) a combination of 
infringing acts plus a regular-place-of-business. The Congressional VENUE proposal, as 
described earlier, would add to this set of eligible venues (3) where the defendant has 
consented to be sued, (4) where the inventor on the patent has done research, and (5) districts 
in which either party had a R&D or manufacturing nexus to products embodying the invention. 
In this Part, we describe our methodology for modeling these rule changes and their impacts.  
We performed analyses that attempted to model the main features of these venue 
rules. We considered what would have happened in 2015, had the proposed interpretation 
been in effect then. Last year patent plaintiffs filed 44% of their cases in the Eastern District of 
Texas. Where would they have filed (assuming that they would have filed at all) had the 
                                                          
106 Fromer, supra note __, at 1492 (arguing that retaining state of incorporation as an alternative venue would 
“sacrific[e] the benefit of clustering suits by industry,” since most firms incorporated in Delaware do not carry on 
their principal business there); Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 281–282, 304 (noting that Delaware is already 
an overly popular forum). 
107 See Fromer, supra note __,  at 1478-79. In a case in which all properly joined defendants are foreign firms with 
no principal place of business in the U.S., Fromer would allow the plaintiff to sue in any district, as is the case now, 
see id. at 1478, and she would institute a “safety valve” under which a court could order a case transferred to the 
plaintiff’s principal place of business “in extreme cases that raise due process concerns,” see id. at 1489. 
108 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 303-305.  Klerman and Reilly also raise the possibility that firms could 
strategically locate their principal place of business to districts “with a pro-defendant reputation,” see id., a 
possibility Fromer dismisses as unlikely, see Fromer, supra note __, at 1491.     
109 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note __, at 304-305. 
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proposed rules of patent venue been in place? That is to say, where would patent plaintiffs file 
if they couldn’t all go to Texas? 
To carry out our analysis, we asked Lex Machina to select 1,000 cases at random110 and 
provide us with all of the defendants in those cases. After correcting for miscodes and Doe 
defendants, we ended with 939 cases against 1128 defendants. We then modeled three pieces 
of information for each defendant/case pair. First, we approximated where each named 
defendant could be sued under proposed venue rules. Second, we compared the results of the 
first step with the actual suit’s venue to determine the percentage of cases that would have to 
be moved to a different district under the proposal. That is, we flagged if the plaintiff could not 
file suit in its chosen district under the proposed rule. Third, we considered where plaintiff and 
plaintiffs of its type had sued in the past and matched that to locations where defendant could 
be sued, and approximated the likely venue of each suit. That is, if a plaintiff sued all over the 
country, then we assumed it would continue to do so. But if a plaintiff sued only in one district, 
we assumed it would sue again in that district if it could legally do so. For each plaintiff-
defendant pair (“case” for short)111 this yielded the following “matches”: 
- An exact match – the plaintiff could have filed the case as is without change. If 
plaintiff P sued defendant D in Oregon, and D can be sued in Oregon under the 
proposal, then the venue would not change under the proposal. 
- A plausible match – the plaintiff could have filed in “Ps preferred venue” – any venue 
plaintiff filed in in 2014-2015. For example, assume plaintiff P sues defendant D in 
Delaware. Assume as well that P filed three cases in 2014-2015, two in Delaware and 
one in Minnesota. If D could only be sued in Minnesota, we would call that a 
plausible match; even though P did not sue D in Minnesota, P was also not 
necessarily adverse to Minnesota, having sued someone else there in the last two 
years. 
- No match – the plaintiff could not sue in the chosen venue, but it could have sued in 
a “class preferred venue” – any venue in the top five of plaintiff’s type.112 If plaintiff 
P sued defendant D in the Northern District of Illinois, but D could not be sued in 
N.D. Ill., then there would be no match. But assume D could be sued in Delaware. 
Then we would flag that as class preferred. Delaware is one of the top five choices 
for NPEs in 2014-2015, and it is also one of the top five choices for product 
companies during that time.113 
- No match – no venue is available under any of the above options. In this case the 
plaintiff would have to sue according to the proposed rule, but would not have any 
                                                          
110 The cases represented those initially filed in 2015, not those transferred from another district and opened in 
2015, which are often miscounted as new cases if not carefully examined. 
111 In reality, each pair was not a case because some cases had multiple defendants. We address this later. 
112 For NPEs the top 5 were E.D.Tex., D.Del., N.D.Cal., N.D.Ill., and N.D. Tex.. For PEs the top 5 were D.Del., D.N.J., 
E.D.Tex., C.D.Cal., and S.D.N.Y. 
113 NPE statue was provided by Unified Patents; we did not agree with every designation, but as a rough cut for this 
exercise, it is accurate enough. 
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of its plausible or plaintiff class preferences fulfilled. We assumed that the suit 
would be where the defendant’s primary place of business was located. 
Using the data sources described below, we profiled each case by plaintiff type (NPE-
Patent assertion entity, NPE-small company, Individual, and, Operating Company (including 
universities), industry of the defendant, and whether the entity was publicly or privately held. 
We obtained the revenue of the entity where possible. We used this profile data to better 
understand the impact of proposed rule changes on different stakeholders. 
To carry out our analysis, we relied on caselaw, several data sources and our own 
assumptions. As these have bearings on our results and introduce known limitations, we 
describe our efforts and sources below (see Appendix/Table A).  
The proponents of TC Heartland would restore venue to the narrowed interpretation of 
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which specifies that venue is proper in “the judicial district where the 
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a 
regular and established place of business.” In Brunette, the Supreme Court, interpreting the 
special patent venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)) as well as the general venue statute (28 
U.S.C. § 1391(d)), confirmed that where a corporation “resides” is where it is incorporated,114 
and that for “aliens,” or foreign companies, venue is proper in “any district.” 115 Even if there 
were a reversion today, we are somewhat confident that foreign corporations could be sued in 
any district.116 Some might argue that, after recent Supreme Court personal jurisdiction 
cases,117 “resides” should instead be the principal place of business. We coded qualifying venue 
accordingly, coding state of incorporation. To the extent that residency under § 1400(b) might 
apply beyond place of incorporation or the new proposals suggest that, we also coded primary 
place of business based on the complaints (which may contain errors), and in some cases, 
company websites. This location would satisfy the second prong of § 1400(b) in any event – 
where the plaintiff is has a place of business and infringed. 
For years, plaintiffs have relied on the liberal interpretation of “reside” under VE Holding 
and, therefore, have not had to rely on the prong of the venue statute that allows for venue 
where there is “infringement and the defendant has a regular and established place of 
business.”  This would change, however, with a law change. To determine all of the places of 
business associated with each party, we used ReferenceUSA, a widely-used database of 
business locations relied upon by other scholars118 which distinguishes between retail, office 
                                                          
114 Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries, 406 U.S. 706, n.2 (1972) (citing Fourco, 353 U.S. 222 (1957))  
115  Brunette, 406 U.S. at 707. 
116 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (“. . . a defendant not resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district, 
and the joinder of such a defendant shall be disregarded in determining where the action may be brought with 
respect to other defendants.”). Even if the special patent venue statute applied, a strict reading of it would mean 
you could not sue a foreign corporation in any district, which would be absurd.  
117 See e.g. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
118 See e.g. Sheila E. Fleischhacker et al., Evidence For Validity Of Five Secondary Data Sources For Enumerating 
Retail Food Outlets In Seven American Indian Communities In North Carolina (2012) available at  
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and manufacturing, and other types of facilities. We supplemented Reference USA with data 
from Hoovers and company websites. 
We had to determine whether or not every retail location should qualify as a “regular 
and established place of business.” Under the majority view, “control” of a business is required 
to trigger venue.119 Virtually any presence by a business will count under the statute, so long as 
it is not transitory.120 However, independent dealers are insufficient to establish a place of 
business unless sufficient control is exerted.121 
Thus, to determine whether a retail location was in a state, we examined the results 
from Reference USA for indicia of ownership and control. This included corporate owned 
stores, like those owned by Costco, Wal-Mart, and GameStop. We also looked to ensure that 
the business presence in a state was not attributed to a subsidiary rather than the parent. And 
when the presence was attributed to the subsidiary, we flagged that as presence for the 
subsidiary, not the parent.122 Finally, we excluded subsidiaries whether they were wholly-
owned,123 independent franchises/dealers (which aren’t really subsidiaries at all), or otherwise 
independent.  
Once we determined that a qualifying business was present in a district, we assumed 
that infringement took place in the district;124 however this assumption may not hold in every 
jurisdiction for every case, just as it did not in Fourco. 
In some cases, multiple defendants were named. We coded each defendant group, as 
well as defendant, separately and analyzed not only whether or not the defendant, but the 
defendant group could be sued in the original or a desired venue. In accordance with statute, 
                                                          
https://ijbnpa.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1479-5868-9-137 (using ReferenceUSA for convenience food 
store locations),  
119 Matthew J. Sampson, Corporate Venue in Patent Infringement Cases, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 207, 223 (1990); 8-21 
Chisum on Patents § 21.02 (“To constitute a ‘regular and established place of business,’ there must be some 
physical location at which the defendant conducts business and over which the defendant exercises control.”). 
120 Chisum, § 21.02 (citing several very small locations constituting a place of business: “Generally, any physical 
location at which business is conducted will suffice, no matter what the amount or character of the activity.”). 
121 Id. (“The cases generally hold that a defendant’s distribution of products through an independent 
representative or agent in the district, even on an exclusive basis, does not constitute a regular and established 
place of business.”). 
122 In some cases where a holding corporation’s only subsidiary was the owner of all the stores and the holding 
company was the only party sued, we attributed the store location to the parent holding company on the theory 
that a plaintiff could easily substitute the proper party in order to obtain venue. 
123 Id.  (“A defendant corporation does not have a regular and established place of business in a district merely 
because a subsidiary has such a place. This is true even of a wholly-owned subsidiary so long as the formalities of 
separate existence are respected.”). 
124 Three factors also led us to make this inference – a) the ubiquity of retailers as defendants, b) online sales, and 
c) software patents, In other words, we assumed that retailers and other branch locations would be accused of 
either selling products at local stores or using software at various locations (or even to communicate between 
locations). Further, we assumed that companies would sell products into the state even if those sales were not 
made by the local branches. Id. (“Furthermore, there need be no particular connection between the activity at the 
place of business and the alleged act of infringement.”).  
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when the defendant group included a foreign defendant, the foreigner’s venues was excluded 
from the analysis.125  
While both court and Congressional proposals would allow venue in the place of 
incorporation, primary place of business, or other place of business (with infringement), the 
Congressional VENUE bill adds additional locations: (3) where the defendant has consented to 
be sued, (4) where the inventor on the patent has done research, and (5) districts in which 
either party had a R&D or manufacturing nexus to products embodying the invention. We 
assumed defendants would not consent to any venue. We obtained patent data for each 
lawsuit and, based on the inventor’s location listed on the face of a patent, determined where 
the inventor on the patent lived and assumed that the research occurred where the inventor 
lived. We attempted to model the portion of the proposal that allows for venue where either 
party had a R&D or manufacturing nexus to products embodying the invention as follows: for 
practicing plaintiffs and small company NPEs, we assumed that R&D/manufacturing/product 
management took place at the location of the initial assignee and at the principal place of 
business. For patent assertion entity plaintiffs, we assumed that no R&D location would be 
available under the terms of the VENUE Act.  Due to a lack of reliable information, we made no 
assumptions about research and manufacturing locations of defendants’ relevant products, but 
our inclusion of principal places of business and states of incorporation in the first prong of 
1400(b) (“resides”) likely compensates for this deficiency in some cases. For this reason, our 
analysis probably overstates the extent to which cases against larger defendants would have to 
move under the VENUE Act, although, as we note below, this number is already relatively small. 
Another known shortcoming of our analysis is that, outside of “exact” matches, it is hard 
to tell with certainty where plaintiffs would choose to file. We assume that plaintiffs plausibly 
would file where they have before, due to greater familiarity with the court. The most tenuous 
matches, however, are those that were considered “preferred” on the basis that other plaintiffs 
of the same type (e.g. operating company. NPE) favored those venues in the past. In reality, 
those plaintiffs might consider other factors. After all, by definition if the plaintiff had not filed 
in one of these districts already, it may be a leap to assume it would do so later. Finally, our 
dataset is small – only 939 cases. Still, the distribution of districts and NPE filings is both random 
and representative of the population; we believe that the results from this analysis are 
instructive. 
While our primary analysis makes it possible to estimate the share of patent cases that 
are filed outside of plaintiffs and defendants’ primary districts, we also thought it would be 
instructive to explore the extent to which patent cases differ (or do not) from non-patent cases 
along this metric. To do so, we performed a supporting analysis of venue in non-patent cases, 
by analyzing a limited sample of data with respect to two sets of defendants: 1) three top 
patent defendants from 2015 (Samsung, Apple, and Actavis)126 for which we gathered data on 
all of their non-patent cases in 2015, and 2) 99 randomly selected patent defendants for which 
                                                          
125 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3). 
126 Brian Howard, Lex Machina 2015 Year in Review Litigation Report, at ___ (on file with the authors) 
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we gathered data on up to 10 non-patent cases in 2015.127 For the randomly selected patent 
defendants we noted where their primary place of business and state of incorporation was, 
based on complaints. We compared these defendant districts to the districts where the 
defendant was actually sued. 
PART III  
In Part III we present the results of our analysis, organized around the central questions 
behind the case for and the results of proposed venue reforms.  The case for reforming venue is 
motivated by the sense that plaintiffs are filing extensively out of defendants’ venues, and 
choosing the Eastern District of Texas. Congressional and court reforms are being advanced on 
the basis that they would change case filing patterns, in a way that would reduce the high 
concentration of cases in the Eastern District and more evenly distribute cases across the 
country, in venues relevant to the cases. We test all of these premises, by first establishing the 
status quo (current filing patterns) and then by reporting how case filings would have been 
distributed according to our model under Congressional and court reform. We report each 
reform scenario separately, referring to the narrowed interpretation of Section 1400 advanced 
by the litigants in TC Heartland as “TC Heartland reform,” and to Congressional enactment of 
the VENUE Act as “VENUE reform” or “Congressional reform.” 
How Extensively are Plaintiffs Filing Out of Defendants’ Venues? 
Though it is widely accepted that NPEs are filing in the Eastern District, the extent to 
which patent plaintiffs in general are taking advantage of permissive venue to sue outside of 
                                                          
127 Defendants include: 3M Company, ACE US Holdings, Inc., Adore Me, Inc., Advance Stores Company, Inc., 
Alembic Pharmaceuticals Limited, Alkem Laboratories Ltd., Alliant Energy Corporation, Allstate Insurance 
Company, Alvogen Pine Brook Inc., Amazon, American Airline, AOL, Audible Magic Corporation, AVer Information 
Inc., Avon Products, Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Barrel House Cooker, LLC, Bath & Body Works, Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Association, BOK Financial Corporation, Boschung America, LLC, BPI LABS, LLC, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company, Broadcom Corporation, Verizon Wireless, Cequel Communications LLC, Ceridian HCM, Inc., Charter 
Communications, Inc., City and County of San Francisco, Command Airsoft Technologies, Inc., Commercial Bank of 
Texas, N.A., Connected Telematics, Extreme Outdoor Products, D-Link Systems, Inc., Dale Alldredge, Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories, LTD., Edwards Lifesciences Corporation, EMC Corporation, Eva Airways, FCA US LLC, Fitbit, Inc., Ford 
Motor Company, Foursevens LLC, Fremont Bancorporation, GTM Products, LLC, Harper and Two, Inc., Hotpads Inc., 
InterActiveCorp, Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., ITC Inc, Jive Communications, Inc., King Digital Entertainment PLC, 
Knight Transportation, Inc., Kohl's Corporation, KVH Industries, Inc., Landis+Gyr Technologies, LLC, 
Ledequipped.com Corp, LEDwholesalers.com, Inc, Lockheed Martin Corporation, LA Times, Luhua Biomarine 
(Shandong) Co., Ltd., Mercedes-Benz USA, Mylan Inc., Dual Electronics Corp., NEC Corporation, NeoMedia 
Technologies, Inc., NHL Interactive Cyberenterprises, LLC, Nico Chee-Ping, Nvidia Corporation, OpticsPlanet, Inc., 
Optimum Trading Co., LLC, OptionsXpress, Inc., Philips Electronics North America Corporation, Praestone Services 
Ltd., Pulse Secure, LLC, Puzhen, R.B. Sandrini, Inc., Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, Regions Financial Corporation, 
Royal Design, Inc., RTIC Coolers, LLC, Sandisk Corporation, Schurman Fine Papers, Schuster Products, LLC, 
Strassburg Medical, LLC, Straumann Holding AG, Telebrands Corp., Texas Instruments Incorporated, Thunder Box 
Inc, Tolmar Inc., Tyco Integrated Security Puerto Rico, Inc., U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc., Vitek Industrial Video 
Products, Inc., Voipo LLC, W.R. Grace & Co. - Conn.'s, Wal-Mart, Wusthof-Trident of America, Inc., and XO 
Communications, LLC.  
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defendants’ venue has not before been established.  Based on our analysis, we found that 
defendants were sued in the district of their primary place of business only 14% of the time, 
leaving defendants out of their home venue a striking 86% of the time (Table 3). This behavior 
was not limited to NPEs – though they sued within the defendant’s primary venue only 10% of 
the time, operating companies sued within defendant’s primary venue only 20% of the time, 
and 80% of the time outside of defendant’s preferred venue.  
If all defendant’s business locations are factored in, including retail stores, defendants 
were sued in a place of business 29% of the time, and at the place of their incorporation about 
15% of the time. The salience of this result is unclear. On the one hand, defendants can hardly 
complain about being sued where incorporated given the long history of the patent venue 
statute. On the other hand, many defendants have few ties to their state of incorporation other 
than filing paperwork. 
In contrast, plaintiffs sued in their own home districts 60% of the time. This count may 
be inflated by NPE formation of LLCs in the Eastern District, even if none of the members live 
there. For example, operating companies only sued in their home district 44% of the time. But 
even when plaintiffs didn’t sue in their own home districts, they didn’t necessarily sue in 
defendant’s primary place of business: by and large, plaintiffs sued anywhere they wanted.  
Table 3: Location of 2015 Filings by Entity Type 
Location Operating NPE Total 
Defendant Principal Place of Business 19.0% 10.0% 14% 
Defendant Places of Business (All) 27.1% 27.3% 29% 
Defendant Place of Incorporation 17.4% 12.4% 15.4% 
Defendant Businesses (All) or Incorporation 35.3% 32.3% 33.2% 
Plaintiffs’ Principal Place of Business 44.4% 66.7% 60% 
 
Are Patent Case Filing Patterns Exceptional?  
Our comparative sample of non-patent cases shows the extent to which patent law may 
be an outlier. Table 4 shows the results of our “deep dive” case studies of the three most sued 
patent defendants, as well as our “shallow dive” of the first ten cases of a random selection of 
99 patent defendants. 52 of these defendants had only patent cases, resulting in about a 
sample that included 271 non-patent cases among approximately 47 defendants. .128 We 
compared non-patent filing patterns to patent filing patterns along three principal dimensions: 
                                                          
128 Several of the companies hit all ten cases, while some had none at all. Thus, the results could possibly be biased 
toward the smaller companies. We divided the defendants into two groups: one of parties who saw eight or more 
cases, and one who saw seven or less. The percentage parties sued in their primary place of business did not 
change appreciably between groups (19% v. 20%). There was a difference for suits in the state of incorporation (4% 
v. 11%), which we attribute to larger companies incorporating in popular lawsuit locations such as Delaware, New 
York and New Jersey. 
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the extent to which defendants were sued outside of their primary place of business, the extent 
to which multiple defendants were named in cases, and the extent to which cases were 
concentrated in particular districts. 
Table 4 shows that non-patent cases were more likely to be filed within defendant’s 
home districts than they were in patent cases were. But not by much – while 14% of patent 
cases were filed in the defendant’s primary place of business, 20% of non-patent cases were 
filed there. While the difference between 14% and 20% is significantly different,129 it is not 
economically different—plaintiffs of all stripes file their cases where they want, and that is 
rarely where the defendant keeps its offices. 
 We observed greater differences between non-patent and patent case filing patterns 
along two other dimensions, however. In 2015, about 44% (45% in our sample) of patent cases 
in were filed in a single district, the Eastern District of Texas. Among non-patent cases in our 
random sample, the top-district attracted only 14% of all cases. This suggests that while non-
patent plaintiffs are suing in their preferred venues, rather than defendants’, they aren’t all 
choosing the same venue.  
The share of cases involving multiple defendants is also a lot higher among non-patent 
cases. While 56% of non-patent cases involved multiple defendants (Table 4), only 16% of 
patent cases did.  Ironically, the additional defendants in those non-patent cases did not reduce 
the out-of-district filings to match patent cases. When there were multiple parties, one would 
have expected at least one of them to be located in the district while all the rest would be 
dragged in from a distant location. But instead, the randome plaintiffs were sued in groups 
more than half the time, and yet were still sued in their home district more often than patent 
plaintiffs.  
 This evidence confirms that the AIA misjoinder rule, curbing the practice of naming 
multiple unrelated patent defendants in a single case, seems to have been successful in 
reducing the number of defendants in each case (consistent with the spike in post-AIA cases 
described earlier) because there was a much smaller proportion of cases involving multiple 
defendants as compared to non-patent cases. But it also suggests that the single-defendant 
patent rule did not shift multiple-defendant patent cases into defendants’ home districts.  
                                                          
129 P=,008 in a one-side t-test. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Patent and Non-Patent Venue 
Cohort 
 
 
 
All Defendants 
(Patent) 
 
 
Defendant 
Apple 
(Non-
Patent) 
Defendant 
Samsung  
(Non-
Patent) 
Defendant 
Actavis 
(Non-
Patent) 
Defendant 
Random 
(Non-
Patent) 
N 1026 47 37 396 271 
Sued in D primary place of business (PPB) 14.1% 21.3% 38.2% 0.0% 20.3% 
Sued in D place of incorporation (POI) 15.3% 14.9% 35.3% 0.0% 9.6% 
Cases involving multiple defendants 16.2% 59.6% 73.0% 96.5% 55.6% 
Share of cases in top district 45.3% 21.28% 35.14% 90.66% 13.6% 
Top District (E.D.Tex) (N.D.Cal.) (N.D.Cal.) (N.D.Ill.) (N.D.Cal.) 
  
 But while comparing our random sample of non-patent cases with our patent cases 
suggests both similarities and differences between these two groups, our case studies provide 
some insight into the variable dynamics of particular types of non-patent cases. First, Apple was 
sued outside of its principal place of business 79% of the time and Samsung 62% of the time. 
Actavis, a pharmaceutical company, in contrast was never sued in its home district, despite 
hundreds of cases filed against it. The Actavis cases comprised state mass tort claims, in which 
multiple parties all filed suit against multiple drug companies at once. This is analogous in some 
ways to high volume patent litigation, in which many defendants are sued in the same district 
by a plaintiff. In addition many of the Samsung cases, which were filed in the defendant’s home 
district (N.D. Cal.) were antitrust cases, which have special venue rules. This implies that special 
venue rules can have the effect of increasing the number of cases brought in the defendant’s 
home district. We explore this prediction by looking next at how patent venue reform would 
change case filing patterns. 
How Would Patent Venue Reform Change Patent Case Filing Patterns? 
While the preceding results were based on treating each party-case separately, we 
considered venue on a case-by-case basis in order to predict where cases would have been 
brought under different rules. We find that if TC Heartland reform had been in effect, 52% of 
operating companies would have to pick a different district than they had originally chosen. For 
NPEs, 60% would have to pick a different district. Another 5% of the cases for each plaintiff type 
would be a plausible match – that is, could be brought somewhere else the plaintiff sued in the 
last two years. That this percentage is small is not surprising, given that most plaintiffs don’t sue 
in that many locations. 
If the VENUE Act were passed, however, the change from the status quo would be a lot 
less dramatic for operating company plaintiffs - only 18% would have to move their case while 
the rest could have been filed as is. NPE plaintiffs also have more choice of where to file under 
the VENUE Act than under TC Heartland reform, but their choices are still significantly 
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constrained: 54% would have to move their cases, a drop of six percentage points. Table 5 
below shows the different outcomes of our predictions. 
Table 5: Likely Outcomes Under Different Reform Options, by Party 
 
Heartland VENUE Act 
nonNPE NPE Total nonNPE NPE Total 
Exact Match (Case Would Not Move) 47.7% 40.0% 42.3% 82.2% 46.4% 57.1% 
Non-Exact Match (Case Would Move) 52.3% 60.0% 57.7% 17.8% 53.6% 42.9% 
Plausible Match - Plaintiff Sued There 
Before 5.7% 5.0% 5.2% 4.3% 6.8% 6.1% 
No Match - But D can be sued in a 
popular district 26.0% 36.9% 33.7% 7.5% 31.5% 24.3% 
No Match - D cannot be sued in any of 
the above 20.6% 18.1% 18.8% 6.0% 15.3% 12.6% 
 
Table 5 shows that under TC Heartland reform, 42% of the cases would remain in place, 
with another 5% moving to another district that the plaintiff had used in the past. That number 
grows to 57% exact matches under the VENUE Act, with another 6.1% for plausible matches. 
The plausible matches were smaller than expected, but reasonable given that most plaintiffs 
only sued in one or two districts. Thus, there were few places for them to go if they could not 
file in their first choice. The “popular” district results are not surprising. Because many cases are 
currently filed in Texas, Delaware, California, and Illinois, and because many defendants are 
located in at least one of those places, then displaced plaintiffs could have properly sued many 
defendants in one of those popular districts if they chose to. 
Where Would Patent Cases Move To? 
Given the predicted displacement, we attempted to predict where cases might move to. 
Table 6 below reports the original locations of each case, followed by the likely location after 
under each proposed reform.130 The distribution of original cases roughly matches the broader 
distribution, implying a representative data set.  
We found that under TC Heartland reform, 46% of defendants would be sued in the 
district of their principal place of business. This drops to 37% under the VENUE Act. In that 
sense, the VENUE Act appears to favor operating plaintiffs at the expense of defendants, with 
minor effects on NPE plaintiffs. 
Results are divided by NPE and nonNPE status to show the varying impacts of venue rule 
changes. 
                                                          
130 Only the top 10 districts are shown; there were 94 in total. 
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Table 6: Modeled Venue of Under Different Reform Options, by Party Type 
 Final Districts – NonNPE Final Districts – NPE 
District 
Actual 
Case 
Prediction 
Heartland 
Prediction 
VENUE 
Act 
Actual 
Case 
Prediction 
Heartland 
Prediction 
VENUE 
Act 
E.D.Tex. 7.8% 4.6% 5.0% 64.1% 19.0% 19.1% 
D.Del. 10.0% 18.9% 11.0% 7.3% 25.8% 23.1% 
D.N.J. 10.3% 12.1% 10.7% 0.9% 2.4% 2.0% 
C.D.Cal. 7.5% 14.2% 9.6% 2.1% 2.6% 2.4% 
N.D.Cal. 5.0% 2.8% 3.9% 3.0% 17.3% 16.6% 
S.D.N.Y. 3.9% 3.6% 3.6% 2.7% 3.0% 2.7% 
N.D.Ill. 3.6% 1.8% 3.2% 2.7% 4.1% 4.3% 
N.D.Tex. 1.4% 0.4% 0.7% 2.7% 3.6% 3.3% 
S.D.Fla. 0.4% 1.8% 1.1% 2.9% 1.8% 4.6% 
W.D.Wash. 3.6% 1.4% 3.6% 0.5% 1.2% 1.5% 
 
Table 6 makes clear that either of the proposed changes to the venue rules would likely 
result in a general shift in case locations. For the NPE group, that should would be decidedly 
away from the Eastern District of Texas, though 19% of cases could still be brought there, down 
from nearly 65%. For both groups, the move would be primarily to the District of Delaware, 
which would increase from 10% to 19% for operating companies and from 7% to 25% for NPEs. 
Interestingly, a move to the Northern District of California is only pronounced for the NPEs, 
from 3% to more than 16%, whereas operating companies would likely sue there less than they 
already do. 
Table 6 also shows that the overall redistribution of cases under the VENUE Act would 
be comparable to the impact of TC Heartland reform, but that non-NPE cases would 
redistribute to lesser extent under VENUE than under TC Heartland reform. Under the VENUE 
Act, we estimate that operating company filings in Delaware would rise from the present 10% 
to 11%, whereas TC Heartland reform would result in 19% of non-NPE cases being filed there. 
Similarly, filings in the Central District of California would rise only 2% (from 7.5% to 9.6% of all 
cases) under Congressional reform rather than double (from 7.5% to 14.2%) under Heartland. 
Note that these differences are not offset by large gains among the top-10 most popular 
districts. Instead, operating companies would continue to sue where they sue now – at their 
own primary place of businesses, which are geographically dispersed.  
This explains why NPE filing patterns would be similar under the VENUE Act or court-
initiated TC Heartland reform. NPE primary places of business are mostly in the Eastern District 
of Texas. Putting aside for a moment the question of whether they actually operate out of 
Texas (a hotly disputed point), the VENUE Act would not allow them to file in Texas because 
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they do not make a product there. Thus, there would be no shift to the plaintiff’s “hometown,” 
the way there would be for operating companies. We do not address whether this is by design 
to deliberately harm NPEs or whether it is merely favoritism to plaintiffs that actually perform 
research, development and manufacturing. We do note, however, that our final predictions are 
not a foregone conclusion. We defaulted to the defendant’s place of business if there were no 
other matching districts, but presumably NPEs could file where the original inventors lived, and 
that would be geographically dispersed. 
How Concentrated Would Cases Be? 
 Under either reform, the cases would see a different concentration than today, and 
decidedly less concentrated with respect to the most populous district. The most concentrated 
district under either model is the District of Delaware, but would have 10 percentage points less 
than the Eastern District’s 2016 share and 20 percentage points less than the Eastern District’s 
2015 share.  
Table 7: Predicted Most Popular Districts, by Reform Option 
District 2015 Actual Heartland VENUE Act 
D.Del 9% 23.8% 19.5% 
E.D.Tex. 44% 14.7% 14.9% 
N.D.Cal. 4% 13.0% 12.8% 
C.D.Cal. 5% 6.1% 4.6% 
D.N.J. 5% 5.3% 4.6% 
   
While the top district would be concentrated, the top three districts would, in total, 
account for about 50% of all the cases—the same as they do in the first half of 2016 (but about 
10% less than in 2015). The cases would, however, be a bit more distributed among those three 
districts. 
When divided by entity type, however, the concentration changes. NPEs would be 
concentrated in the same top three districts, with about 40% in Delaware and Northern 
California and another 19% in Texas. Among operating companies, the top three districts would 
be Delaware, Central California, and New Jersey, with the top two hosting 33% under Heartland 
reform and 22% under the VENUE Act. 
Which Parties Would Move?  
The model also allows some examination of which parties would be most likely to see a 
change of districts. Overall, VENUE Act reform would require only 18% of non-NPE cases to be 
refiled, and over 50% of NPE cases to be filed. The differential impact on defendant types are 
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illustrated more clearly in the analysis of TC Heartland reform, which would cause a majority of 
both NPE and non-NPE cases to move. 
Among those defendants sued by NPEs companies located all over the country would 
move districts at about the same rate.  However, in absolute terms, the number of defendants 
in Northern and Central (Los Angeles) California is much larger than the others. More than a 
quarter of all the moved NPE cases would affect companies in those two districts alone. This 
would affect nearly 75% of the cases filed against companies from those two districts. 
Among those companies sued by operating companies, the most significantly impacted 
districts would be New Jersey (known for pharmaceuticals), Northern District of Illinois, and the 
Northern District of California. 
Among the plaintiffs, the most significantly impacted would be those who have a 
principal place of business in the Eastern District of Texas. More than two-thirds of plaintiffs 
located there would have to move to another district. Most of these are NPEs, though there 
were a handful of operating companies affected. 
Among operating companies, about one-third of foreign plaintiffs would have to choose 
a different district. Virtually all of the cases filed by operating companies located in 
Washington, Utah, and Illinois would have to move.  
Some cases would not move, however. Foreign companies would move only 5% of the 
time—primarily in cases in which they were defendants with non-local U.S. companies. These 
were very few of the cases, as most foreign companies were either sued on their own or were 
sued with companies that in district. In addition, defendants with large geographic footprints 
like large retailers for example would still be subject to jurisdiction outside of their favored 
jurisdictions. 
PART IV 
 This study examined the concentration of cases in the Eastern District of Texas and 
explore how changing venue rules might affect that concentration of cases. It considers where 
parties are being sued, where they would be sued under different reform, and which types of 
parties will be affected. It finds that plaintiffs of types are suing out of defendant venue a 
majority of the time, and that proposed reforms would change this, particularly as to the 
Eastern District of Texas. Court reform would go the farthest, causing both NPEs and non-NPEs 
to have to refile most of their cases, while the reforms Congress is contemplating would have a 
much greater impact on NPEs than others. The normative takeaways from this exercise will 
surely depend on viewpoint. But if there is a will to reform venue, this paper shows what the 
path may look like. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A 
Data  Primary Data Source Comments 
1,000 2015 cases selected at 
random 
Lex Machina Final cases reflect slight skew 
to NPE cases (71% in 
sample131 vs. 67% overall132), 
but are representative of 
venue distribution 
Plaintiff status codings (e.g. 
NPE, OpCo, Individual) 
Unified Patents 
Party Place of Incorporation 
and Primary Place of Business 
Complaints Supplemented with website 
research 
Place of Business with R&D 
or manufacturing nexus to 
the invention  
ReferenceUSA, Innography Supplemented with website 
research and Hoovers 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
131 Authors’ analysis 
132 Unified Patents, 2015 Patent Dispute Report (December 31, 2015) available at 
http://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-dispute-report. 
